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Nehring (2004) proposes an interesting methodology to extend the utilitarian criterion
deﬁned under complete information to an interim social welfare ordering allowing to com-
pare acts. The ﬁrst axiom deﬁning his approach, called “State Independence,” requires
the interim social welfare ordering to be consistent with ex-post utilitarian comparisons:
if it is commonly known that the act f selects in each state an outcome that is socially
prefererred according to the utilitarian criterion to the lottery selected by an alternative
act g, then f should be interim socially preferred to g. The second axiom is a classical
condition of consistency with respect to interim Pareto comparisons: if an act f interim
Pareto dominates and act g, then f should be interim socially preferred to g. Nehring
proves that 1) these two axioms are incompatible if there is no common prior, and 2)
that the unique interim social welfare ordering that satisﬁes these two axioms when there
is a common prior is the ex-ante utilitarian criterion.
The purpose of this comment is to show that Nehring’s methodology does not prove
helpful in ﬁnding ways of extending other classical social welfare orderings. I show in-
deed that the corresponding state-independence property becomes incompatible with the
interim Pareto criterion for a very large class of common priors, as soon as the social
welfare ordering satisﬁes the strict Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (strict PD for short).
I also show that his impossibility result in the absence of a common prior extends to any
social welfare ordering that satisﬁes PD. The Pigou-Dalton principle states that transfer-
ring utility so as to reduce inequality should never hurt from a social perspective. Strict
PD requires that the resulting utility proﬁle is socially strictly preferred. PD is often
viewed as a very appealing axiom in social choice theory, and indeed all the classical
social welfare orderings (e.g. utilitarian sum, egalitarian minimum, and Nash product)
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1satisfy it. The utilitarian criterion has the distinctive property of satisfying PD, but not
its strict variant.
I start the formal analysis by quickly reminding the content of Nehring’s (2004) model.
Let I be the ﬁnite set of individuals, let X be the set of deterministic social alternatives,
and let L be the set of probability distribution over X (with ﬁnite support). Individ-
uals are expected utility maximizers. Let ui : X → R be individual i’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. There is a ﬁnite set Ω of states that determine the agents’
beliefs pi : Ω → ∆(Ω), and hence their preferences over acts :
f 
ω















for each i ∈ I, each f : Ω → L, and each g : Ω → L. The belief functions are assumed to
satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Introspection) pω
i ({α ∈ Ω|pα
i = pω
i }) = 1, for all ω ∈ Ω and all i ∈ I.
Assumption 2 (Truth) pω
i ({ω}) > 0, for all ω ∈ Ω and all i ∈ I.
Introspection says that agents are always (at any state ω) certain of their own belief
pω
i . The Truth assumption requires that individuals put positive probability on the true
state; agents therefore can never be wrong in their probability-one beliefs. Nehring ﬁnally
assumes that the individuals’ utility functions and the set of social alternatives are such
that any real number can be derived as the utility of some lottery over X:
Assumption 3 (Rich Domain) For each ν ∈ RI, there exists l ∈ L such that ν =
P
x∈X l(x)ui(x), for each i ∈ I.
For any α ∈ Ω, Ti(α) = {ω ∈ Ω|pα
i (ω) > 0} is the set of states that individual i thinks
possible. Introspection and Truth implies that {Ti(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} forms a partition of Ω.
Individual i knows an event E ⊆ Ω at α if Ti(α) ⊆ E. E is common knowledge if
everybody knows E, everybody knows that everybody knows E, and so forth. Formally,
if TI is the ﬁnest common coarsening of the individuals’ knowledge partitions, then E is
common knowledge at α if TI(α) ⊆ E. A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(Ω) is a common
prior if pω
i (A) = µ(A|Ti(ω)), for all i ∈ I, A ⊆ Ω, and ω ∈ Ω such that µ(ω) > 0.
A social welfare ordering (under complete information) is a complete and transitive
binary relation R deﬁned on RI. Classical examples include the utilitarian criterion, RU




i∈I vi, the egalitarian criterion, RE with uREv if
2and only if mini∈I ui ≥ mini∈I vi, and the Nash criterion,1 RN with uRNv if and only if
Πi∈Iui ≥ Πi∈Ivi. P will denote the strict component of R, i.e. uPv if uRv and not vRu.
R satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (PD) if vRu for any u,v such that there
exist two individuals i and j such that ui < uj, vi ≤ vj, ui + uj = vi + vj, ui < vi, and
u−ij = v−ij. Inequality is thus reduced when moving from u to v, since v is obtained from
u by “transferring” some utility from j to i, while i was and remains after the transfer
with less utility compared to j. R satisﬁes the strict Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
(strict PD) if vRu is replaced by vPu.
An interim social welfare ordering is a transitive ordering I (even possibly incom-
plete) deﬁned on the set of acts. Two axioms will be imposed. The ﬁrst is directly
reproduced from Nehring (2004).
Interim Pareto Dominance (IPD) f I g (resp. f i g) whenever it is commonly
known that f α
i g (resp. f α
i g) for all i ∈ I.
The second axiom is the direct analogue of Nehring’s second axiom, where the ex-post
utilitarian criterion is replaced by a generic social welfare ordering R.
State Independence Given R (SI-R) f I g whenever it is commonly known that
f(ω)Rg(ω).
Following Nehring’s terminology, say that a function φ : Ω → R is acceptable if there
exists a collection (φi)i∈I from Ω to R such that φ =
P
i∈I φi and such that it is common
knowledge that Eα
i φi > 0, for all i ∈ I. Thinking of φ as determining an aggregate level
of transferable utility in every state, being acceptable then means that there is a way to
share this total amount of utility in each state so that it is common knowledge that the
resulting contingent allocation of utilities is strictly interim individually rational.
Nehring’s impossibility result follows from a classical characterization of the non-
existence of a common prior (see Nehring (2004, Theorem A.1.(i)) who traces the result
back to Morris (1994)): a common prior exists if and only if φ = 0 is not acceptable.
It is then straightforward to adapt Nehring’s (2004, Theorem 2) argument to show that
his impossibility result in the absence of a common prior extends to any social welfare
ordering that satisﬁes PD.
Proposition 1 Let R be a social welfare ordering that satisﬁes PD. If there is no common
prior, then there is no interim social welfare ordering that satisﬁes both IPD and SI-R.
Proof: φ = 0 is acceptable, since there is no common prior, and hence there exists (φi)i∈I
1The Nash criterion is deﬁned only over RI
++, and all the results presented in this comment apply
also to that more restrictive domain.
3such that (a)
P
i∈I φi(ω) = 0, for each ω ∈ Ω, and (b) it is common knowledge that
Eα
i φi > 0, for all i ∈ I. Let now f and g be two acts such that ui(f(ω)) = φi(ω) and
ui(g(ω)) = 0, for all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω (existence guaranteed under the assumption of Rich
Domain). Since R satisﬁes PD, (a) implies that g(ω)Rf(ω), for each ω, and hence g I f,
by SI-R. On the other hand, (b) implies that is it common knowledge that f ω
i g, and
hence f I g, by IPD, which contradicts the previous comparison. 
Nehring proves that the converse is true when R is the utilitarian criterion: if there
is a common prior, then there exists an interim social welfare ordering that satisﬁes both
IPD and SI-RU (in addition, it is unique, and it coincides with the ex-ante utilitarian
criterion). I will show that this possibility result does not extend to other classical social
welfare orderings. I will say that a function φ : Ω → R is weakly acceptable if there
exists a collection (φi)i∈I from Ω to R such that φ =
P
i∈I φi, and such that it is common
knowledge that Eα
i φi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ I. If there is no common prior, then φ = 0 is
acceptable, and hence a fortiori weakly acceptable. If there is a common prior µ, then
φ = 0 is not acceptable, but it might be weakly acceptable in a non trivial sense meaning
that there exists ω in the support of µ and i ∈ I such that φi(ω) 6= 0. The next lemma
oﬀers a characterization of those common priors.
Lemma 1 Suppose that there exists a common prior µ. Then φ = 0 is weakly acceptable
in a non trivial sense if and only if there exist a sequence (ωk)K
k=1 and a sequence (ik)K
k=1 of
individuals such that ωk+1 6= ωk, ik+1 6= ik, and ωk−1 ∈ Tik(ωk), for each k ∈ {1,...,K},
with the convention 0 = K.
Proof: ⇒) Let (φi)i∈I be a non trivial decomposition of φ = 0. Notice that Eω0
i φi = Eω
i φi
if ω0 ∈ Ti(ω). So, for any Ti ∈ {Ti(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}, E
Ti
i φi will denote Eω
i φi, for some (or all)

















Hence it must be that Eω
i φi = 0, for all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω. Since the decomposition of
φ is non trivial, one can ﬁnd an i and an ω for which φi(ω) 6= 0. Call him i2, call it ω1,
and let’s say to ﬁx our ideas that φi2(ω1) < 0 (a similar reasoning applies if the inequality
is reversed). Since E
ω1
i2 φi2 = 0, there must exist ω ∈ Ti2(ω1) such that φi2(ω) > 0. Call
it ω2. Since ω2 ∈ Ti2(ω1), we also have that ω1 ∈ Ti2(ω2). Since
P
i∈I φi(ω2) = 0, there
must exists another individual, call him i3, for whom φi3(ω2) < 0. Since E
ω2
i3 φi3 = 0,
there must exist ω3 ∈ Ti3(ω2) such that φi3(ω3) > 0. Since ω3 ∈ Ti3(ω2), we also have
4that ω2 ∈ Ti3(ω3). Iterating the argument, one of the new states, let’s say ¯ ω, will have
already appeared previously, since Ω is ﬁnite. The subsequence starting at ¯ ω, and ending
at the state right before its reappearance, combined with the associated individuals (take
i1 as the individual that led to the reappearance of ¯ ω - it must be that this individual
i1 is diﬀerent from i2, since φi2(¯ ω) < 0 < φi1(¯ ω)), satisﬁes the necessary condition, as
desired.
⇐) Let (ωk)K
k=1 be a sequence of states as in the statement, with the additional property
that there is no shorter sequence of states with that property. It implies that
(∀k ∈ {1,...,K}) : Tik(ωk) ∩ {ωl|1 ≤ l ≤ K} = {ωk−1,ωk}. (1)
I prove this by contradiction. Suppose thus, on the contrary, that there exist k ∈
{1,...,K} and l ∈ {1,...,K} \ {k − 1,k} such that ωl ∈ Tik(ωk). Hence ωk−1 ∈ Tik(ωl).
Suppose ﬁrst that l < k−1. If il+1 = ik, then one reaches a contradiction since the subse-
quence that starts with l+1 and ends with k−1 is shorter than the original sequence and
satisﬁes all the properties of the statement (ωl ∈ Tik(ωl+1) and ωk−1 ∈ Tik(ωl) imply that
ωk−1 ∈ Tik(ωl+1)). If il+1 6= ik, then again one reaches a contradiction, since the subse-
quence that starts with l and ends with k−1, changing only il into ik, is shorter than the
original sequence while satisfying all the properties of the statement. Suppose now that
l > k. If il = ik, then the subsequence that starts with k and ends with l − 1 is shorter
than the original sequence while satisfying the properties of the statement (ωl−1 ∈ Tik(ωl)
and ωl ∈ Tik(ωk) imply that ωk ∈ Tik(ωl−1)). This is not possible. If il 6= ik, then the
subsequence that starts with k and ends with l is shorter than the original sequence
(notice that it cannot be that k = 1 and l = K, since l 6= k − 1), while satisfying all the
properties of the statement. Again, this is impossible, and we can conclude that (1) is
indeed correct.
Given any α > 0, construct the collection (φi)i∈I by the following recursive formula:
φi1(ω1) = α, φi2(ω1) = −α, and (∀i ∈ I \ {i1,i2}) : φi(ω1) = 0










(∀i ∈ I \ {ik,ik+1}) : φi(ωk) = 0
(∀ω ∈ Ω \ {ωk|1 ≤ k ≤ K})(∀i ∈ I) : φi(ω) = 0.
Notice that, by construction,
P
i∈I φi(ω) = 0, for all i ∈ I, and Eω
i φi = 0, for all
5(ω,i) ∈ Ω×I for which there does not exist 1 ≤ k ≤ K such that i = ik and ω ∈ Tik(ω).
Consider now a pair (ω,i) and a k such that i = ik and ω ∈ Tik(ω). The property proved
in the previous paragraph implies that µ(Ti(ω))Eω
i φi = µ(ωk−1)φik(ωk−1)+µ(ωk)φik(ωk).
If k 6= 1, then it is straightforward to check that Eω
i φi = 0, by deﬁnition of φik(ωk). If
k = 1, then
µ(Ti(ω))E
ω








α + µ(ω1)α = 0.
Hence Eω
i φi = 0, for all i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω, and it is thus also common knowledge that
Eω
i φi = 0, for all i ∈ I, as desired. 
Notice that the condition characterizing priors for which φ = 0 is weakly acceptable in
a non trivial sense, is very weak. For instance, it is satisﬁed if there exist two individuals i
and j, and a state ω such that Ti(ω)∩Tj(ω) contains at least two states. Indeed, suppose
that the intersection contains ω0 in addition to ω. The condition in the Lemma is satisﬁed
with ω1 = ω, i1 = i, ω2 = ω0, and i2 = j. In particular, of course, it is satisﬁed when,
while facing uncertainty, all the individuals have the same information (Ti(ω) = Ω, for all
i ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω). The condition in the Lemma is also satisﬁed when the information
structure is derived from types with a joint probability distribution that has full support:
a set of types Ti with at least two elements is associated to each individual i, Ω = ×i∈ITi,
and µ has full support over Ω. Indeed, the condition of the Lemma is satisﬁed with i1 = 2,
i2 = 1, i3 = 2, i4 = 1, ω1 = (t1,t2,t−12), ω2 = (t1,t0
2,t−12), ω3 = (t0
1,t0
2,t−12), and ω4 =
(t0
1,t2,t−12). Here is yet another example where the condition of the Lemma is satisﬁed,
while not falling in the two previous cases. Suppose that Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}, I = {1,2,3},
the ﬁrst individual’s information partition is {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}, the second individual’s
information partition is {{ω1,ω3},{ω2}}, and the third individual’s information partition
is {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}}. The the condition of the Lemma is satisﬁes for (ωk)3
k=1 by choosing
i1 = 2, i2 = 1, and i3 = 3. So ﬁnally here are two examples where the condition does
not apply, and hence where a weakly acceptable decomposition of φ = 0 is necessarily
trivial. As a ﬁrst example, consider the case where all the agents but one are fully
informed. As a second example, consider the case where I = {1,2}, Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}, the
ﬁrst individual’s information partition is {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}, and the second individual’s
information partition is {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}}.
Lemma 1 allows to show that IPD and SI-R are essentially incompatible when R
satisﬁes strong PD. I will slightly strengthen SI-R by requiring that the resulting interim
6social comparison appearing in the axiom is strict if there is some state ω in the support
of µ for which f(ω)Pg(ω). There are ways to show the incompatibility of IPD and SI-R
with some additional technical assumptions on R, but the modiﬁcation of SI-R seems so
innocuous and natural that I will not pursue that direction.
Strong State Independence Given R (SSI-R) f I g whenever it is commonly known
that f(ω)Rg(ω). If, in addition, f(ω)Pg(ω) for some ω in the support of the common
prior, then f I g.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there is a common prior µ that satisﬁes the condition in
Lemma 1, and let R be a social welfare ordering that satisﬁes strict PD. Then there is no
interim social welfare ordering that satisﬁes both IPD and SSI-R.
Proof: φ = 0 is weakly acceptable in a non-trivial sense, by Lemma 1, and hence there
exists (φi)i∈I such that (a)
P
i∈I φi(ω) = 0, for each ω ∈ Ω, (b) it is common knowledge
that Eα
i φi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ I, and (c) φi(ω) 6= 0, for some i ∈ I and some ω in the support
of µ. Let now f and g be two acts such that ui(f(ω)) = φi(ω) and ui(g(ω)) = 0, for all
i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω (existence guaranteed under the assumption of Rich Domain). Since
R satisﬁes strict PD, (a) and (c) imply that g(ω)Rf(ω), for each ω, and g(ω)Pf(ω), for
some ω in the support of µ. Hence g I f, by SSI-R. On the other hand, (b) implies
that is it common knowledge that f ∼ω
i g, and hence f ∼I g, by IPD, which contradicts
the previous strict comparison. 
RN is deﬁned only over R++, and hence one may wonder whether the reasoning for
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 also apply on that restricted domain. It does. Although
the comparison in the proof of Proposition 2 involve φ = 0, one could also have started
instead with any strictly positive number to be split equally among the individuals in
every state. Then the non trivial decomposition of φ = 0 can be added to this equal-split.
One can make sure that this new allocation of utilities remains in R++, as the magnitude
of the transfers in (φi)i∈I can be made as small as needed, given that we are free to choose
α in the proof of Lemma 1.
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds by showing the direct incompatibility of the in-
terim social comparisons imposed by IPD and SSI-R when the common prior satisﬁes
the condition of Lemma 1. Unfortunately, one cannot be sure of the existence of a tran-
sitive interim social welfare ordering that satisﬁes IPD and SSI-R (or SI-R) even in the
rare cases where that condition is not satisﬁed and these interim comparisons are not
directly incompatible. Consider for instance the case where I = {1,2}, Ω = {ω1,ω2},
7the common prior is uniform, the ﬁrst individual’s information partition is {{ω1},{ω2}},
and the second individual’s information partition is {{ω1,ω2}}. It is easy to check that
interim Pareto comparisons are not in contradiction with the comparisons derived from
SI-RE. In fact, it is not even possible to ﬁnd a cycle from these comparisons with only
three acts, but well with four. Consider the four acts f1, f2, f3, and f4 that generate
the following ex-post utilities:
f1 f2 f3 f4
ω1 (0,5) (4,100) (3,50) (50,3)
ω2 (0,5) (50,4) (49,50) (50,49)
SI-RE implies that f1 I f2 and f3 I f4, while IPD implies that f2 I f3 and
f4 I f1, hence the contradiction with transitivity.
Following the strong negative results presented in this note, and yet the importance
of equity considerations in social choice, I have developed an alternative methodology
to obtain a notion of interim egalitarianism in de Clippel (2010). This new approach
diﬀers in many respect from Nehring’s work. First, attention is paid to interim social
choice functions instead of interim social welfare orderings. Second, incentive constraints
are taken into account by modeling the physical description underlying social choice
problems. Third, the analysis does not involve any explicit comparison with the ex-post
stage. Instead, it is conducted entirely at the interim stage, aiming at characterizing
the solution that satisﬁes natural analogues of Kalai’s (1977, Theorem 1) axioms. The
resulting criteria may violate ex-post egalitarian comparisons, but are still viewed as an
extension of the egalitarian principle to frameworks under asymmetric information since
they do coincide with that principle in the special case where information is complete. As
an analogy, when the individuals face symmetric uncertainty, applying the social welfare
ordering R to the ex-ante utilities is often considered as a natural criterion, even if the
resulting comparisons may conﬂict with uniform comparisons through R at the ex-post
stage (see Myerson, 1981).
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